Construction Industry

Construction Industry, Project Management

Leading causes of project failure in region

 

The majority of respondents pointed to improper planning and methodology (78 per cent), lack of communication (75 percent), and unrealistic target completion dates (67 percent) as the top three contributing factors to project failure. They also identified inadequate commitment and involvement from senior management (59 percent), insufficient budgets and resources (56 percent), too many assumptions and unknowns (51 percent), project politics and conflicts (38 percent), lack of set targets or measurable results (45 percent), and the formation of the wrong project team (27 percent) as other major causes. …

Construction Industry, Project Management

Are Project Managers Overrated?

Not everyone believes in project managers. Some common complaints include:

  • They focus on planning and processes, and in the end, don’t produce anything of value.
  • They speak using business and project management double-talk, and produce only papers, charts,
    graphs, analysis, etc, to justify why no actual product was going into production.
  • They have a lack of real experience in the subject area, and they do not know how to actually build a final deliverable. …
Construction Industry, Contract Administration

Tests on Completion under the FIDIC Yellow Book

by Sarah Thomas

I am a contractor working on a wastewater project in Eastern Europe, using the FIDIC Yellow Book –Design & Build. Vol.3 of our contract contains the following clause:

Tests on Completion

The test on completion duration shall be 90 days.

The first 30 days shall be a monitoring period during which the Contractor sets up the operation of the plant and conducts his own water quality tests to confirm that the final effluent consent has been met. At the end of this period the Contractor shall notify the Engineer that the plant is complete and meeting the Process Guarantee which then shall be met by a further 30 consecutive days before Taking Over can take place.”

We have met the final 30 consecutive days successfully and want taking over. The Employer says we must complete the 90 days which takes us outside of the construction period and hence delay damages are being threatened.

I say we have satisfied the contract at the end of the 30 consecutive days and we should get Take Over even though it is not 90 days.

Have you any idea if we are right in our assessment?

Answer:
Firstly, a couple of brief provisos. I assume that you have made no amendments to the Yellow Book that affect this issue. I’m also assuming that, as you say, otherwise the works have indeed all been completed in accordance with the Contract.

Have the Tests on Completion been passed and are the Works ready for Taking Over?

Obviously your argument is that having satisfied the first 30 day monitoring period and then completed the further 30 consecutive day period and having notified the Engineer that the plant is complete and meeting the Process Guarantee, you have therefore satisfied the requirements for completion and Take Over.

Clause 10 – which deals with Taking Over – says that the Works must have been completed in accordance with the Contract and that a Taking-Over Certificate must have been issued. The Employer must issue such certificate within 28 days of an application if the Works are substantially complete in accordance with the Contract (i.e. apart from minor outstanding work and defects not substantially affecting the Works); otherwise the certificate is deemed to have been issued.

Crucially, “completion” for these purposes includes:

• achieving the passing of the Tests on Completion; and
• “completing all work which is stated in the Contract as being required for the Works to be considered completed for the purposes of taking over”.

So it all comes down to (1) what is required to achieve passing of the Tests on Completion and (2) what the Contract states needs to be completed to achieve take over.

Under the Yellow Book, “Tests on Completion” means “those tests which are specified in the Contract or agreed by both Parties…and which are carried out under Clause 9 [Tests on Completion] before the Works…are taken over by the Employer”.

Clause 9 goes on to spell out the process for carrying out these tests, which falls into 3 stages – pre-commissioning tests, commissioning tests and trail operation – the latter which is intended to show that the plant is operating reliably.

Ambiguous provisions

I think that the Engineer/Employer will forcefully argue that waiting for the 90th day to elapse is part of the “trial operation” and is required for you to pass the Tests on Completion. I agree that there is some ambiguity in the wording in Volume 3 of the Contract as it states: “At the end of this period the Contractor shall notify the Engineer that the plant is complete and meeting the Process Guarantee which then shall be met by a further 30 consecutive days before Taking Over can take place.” However, my own view is that the drafting of the full testing period is clear and explicit – “The test on completion duration shall be 90 days“. Bearing in mind that FIDIC explicitly states “The documents forming the Contract are to be taken as mutually explanatory of one another” I do not think that this wording is actually inconsistent with the words: “which then shall be met by a further 30 consecutive days before Taking Over can take place”. In my view, all the Contract is saying is that the actual commissioning tests period is 30 days but there is then a further 30 day trial operation period to ensure the plant is operating reliably. This is also consistent with the description of Tests on Completion (and the 3 stages) described in Clause 9.1.
Of course, it is open to you to request clarification on this point from the Engineer. Clause 1.5.2 of the General Conditions provides that: “If an ambiguity or discrepancy is found in the documents, the Engineer shall issue any necessary clarification or instruction.”

You do not mention if the Engineer in this case is an independent engineer or is part of the Employer organisation. Whichever is the case, he may well come to the same view as the Employer and, in my opinion, this would be consistent with:

• the express wording (”The test on completion duration shall be 90 days“);
• interpreting the documents as mutually explanatory of each other; and
• the 3 stage process of Tests on Completion which includes a “trial operation”.

Whether or not the Engineer is truly independent, Clause 3.5 applies when a party asks the Engineer for clarification and provides that he must consult with each party in an endeavour to reach agreement. If agreement is not reached, “the Engineer shall make a fair determination in accordance with the Contract, taking due regard of all relevant circumstances.”

The Engineer must give notice to both parties of the determination with supporting particulars. Each Party shall give effect to each agreement or determination unless and until revised under Clause 20 (Claims, Disputes and Arbitration).

What do you do now?

Whilst I think that the correct interpretation is that the testing period is the full 90 days, I am conscious that complying with this period will put you in delay and at risk of liquidated damages for delay. Therefore in practical terms, I think that you should at least make the argument that you have already substantially completed. I think that there is sufficient ambiguity in the Volume 3 wording to argue that the Tests on Completion have been completed and that you are entitled to issue of the Taking-Over Certificate. Therefore you should apply for issue of this certificate if you haven’t already done so (although if you haven’t already done so you will still have to wait at least 28 days before the Engineer is obliged to issue the certificate or you can argue that it is deemed to be issued).

Under Clause 10.1 [Taking Over of the Works and Sections], the Engineer is deemed to have issued a Taking Over Certificate if he fails either to issue a TO Certificate or rejects the Contractor’s application for a TO Certificate within a period of 28 days after receiving the Contractor’s application.

You have not said whether or not the Engineer has rejected the application. If he has not, and more than 28 days has elapsed since you issued it, then the TO Certificate will be deemed to have been issued on the last day of the 28-day period.

Of course, if you applied for the TO Certificate right before the end of the 30+30 days, then the Engineer has up to 28 days to issue or reject, and you are almost in the same position as if your completion test phase was 90 days. If you applied substantially earlier than that then it will make a bigger difference and might be the difference between completing on time or late.

If you are late, then there probably is no harm in making the application for a Taking-Over Certificate. Note that in accordance with Clause 10.1.3(b) of the General Conditions, if the Engineer wishes to reject the application, he has to give reasons and specify the work that is required to be done by the Contractor to enable the TO Certificate to be issued. Even if the Engineer has purported to reject your application, you might be able to argue that he has not done so in accordance with the contract, because he has not specified the work that is required to be done in order to enable the TO Certificate to be issued. Of course in my view, he is likely to simply point to the further 30 day trail operation period under the Contract.

Delay to Testing

Whilst I do not think you have a basis of claim (as my interpretation of the Contract is that you have not yet fully passed the Tests on Completion), if the Employer’s insistence on you waiting until the end of 90 days after the start of the testing period is not permitted under the Contract, there is potentially the right to claim for delay. Clause 7.4.5 provides that “If the Contractor suffers delay and/or incurs Cost … as a result of a delay for which the Employer is responsible, the Contractor shall give notice to the Engineer and shall be entitled to claim both an extension of time and “payment of any such Cost plus reasonable profit, which shall be included in the Contract Price” (Clause 7.4.5(b)). Equally there is the ground in Clause 8.4.1 (e), being “any delay, impediment or prevention caused by or attributable to the Employer, the Employer’s Personnel, or the Employer’s other contractors on the Site.” The Employer’s Personnel, as defined, includes the Engineer.

Any right to claim will be subject to strict compliance with FIDIC’s notice provisions in Sub-Clause 20.1 (Contractor’s Claims)). I have previously stressed the importance of getting your notice exactly right in the previous Q&A; click here to read more. After receiving this notice, the Engineer shall proceed in accordance with Sub-Clause 3.5 (Determinations) (see above) to agree or determine these matters.

One final note

Finally, do you have any minutes or notes of any discussions with the Employer about completion testing? If you do, have a look at them to see whether they clarify the position. Obviously it will be helpful if you have evidence that you and the Employer intended the tests to consist of the 30-day monitoring period plus the second consecutive 30-day period only. It is worth noting that FIDIC Yellow Book does not include an “entire agreement” clause precluding extra contractual documents/negotiations in interpreting the Contract. If you have clear evidence that the parties both intended the completion tests to last for 30 days plus 30 days (only) then you may be able to claim successfully that the figure 90 was inserted into the contract by mistake instead of 60, in the event that the dispute goes to arbitration.

 

Kluwer Construction Blog

Construction Industry, Construction Law

Legislation on waste disposal in Russia: some practical tips for contractors

by George Burn

Post prepared by Karina Chichkanova (Partner, Head of Salans’ St. Petersburg Real Estate Group) and Galina Pashkovskaya (Associate)

In connection with the constantly increasing volume of construction in Russia, one of the main issues that developers and construction companies encounter is the problem of managing the waste that results from wrecking or construction works, as well as “abandoned” waste located at the land plot under development.

“Ownership of and responsibility for waste” provisions of Russian law and construction work contracts or waste removal and disposal contracts in Russia are very important and should not be ignored by the parties.

The key legal issue that arises in connection with construction waste with regard to the general contractor, subcontractors, and the customer is: to whom does the waste belong and who will be responsible for it? The answer to that question is particularly important, since it is the owner’s responsibility to make the payments for disposal of industrial and consumer waste, which is considered a negative impact on the surrounding environment. Along with the ecological payments, the owner’s responsibility for waste includes the obligation to clear the land plot of waste, to remove and site (store and bury) the waste, and the obligation to perform actions towards the recultivation and renewal of the land, which differs depending on the hazard class of the waste. All of these incurs additional and in some cases very significant expenses for the waste’s owner.

The main regulatory act in the sphere of waste management in Russia is the Federal Law “On industrial and consumer waste” dated 24 June 1998, No. 89 FZ (“Law on Waste”). The Law on Waste establishes two basic situations in which ownership rights to waste arise:

(i) Construction waste. Generally, waste is the property of the entity that owns the raw materials, materials, semi-processed items, and other articles or products, as well as the goods (products) whose use resulted in the creation of such waste. Usually, disposal of waste produced during demolition work will therefore rest with the owner of the building. And the contractor will bear responsibility for the waste created in its activities as a result of using its materials.

Thus, unless the contractor’s agreement or an agreement on waste removal expressly stipulates transfer of the rights to the waste to the contractor, or to the party performing the removal of waste, the customer that ordered the work makes ecological payments and is responsible for waste disposal, waste removal, and clearing the land. However, the transfer of responsibility for waste to contractors is common in Russian practice. Thus it is very important for contractor to have all agreements reviewed by legal and ecological experts to avoid subsequent confusion as to responsibility for waste and properly manage the contractor’s risks and expenses arose from such ownership to waste.

(ii) “Abandoned” waste. The lack of specially-equipped facilities for disposal of the waste (landfills, slurry pits, etc.) has led to the creation of a number of unsanctioned landfills in most regions in Russia. As a result, large areas have been polluted. Historically, all land in Russia was owned by the state, and the state still remains a major land owner and actively grants the state land for development purposes. It is not uncommon for plots of land granted by the state for construction to turn out to be a former landfill site, perhaps containing industrial waste, resulting in significant soil contamination. It also worth mentioning that ecological regulations on maximum permitted emissions (MPE) and maximum permitted concentrations (MPC) in Russia are often stricter than in other parts of Europe, which can lead a foreign investor inadvertently to expose itself to administrative or even criminal liability.

In practice, determining the original owner of the waste – the person who illegally dumped the waste on the empty land plot – is often impossible. Under the Law on Waste such waste is called “abandoned” waste. The state has released itself from liability for abandoned waste by setting forth in the Law that the entity in possession (whether in ownership or lease) of the plot on which the abandoned waste is found may acquire it through the use of such waste or by performing some other action that bears witness to its having been taken into possession in accordance with then Russian сivil law. Thus the owner of abandoned waste becomes the person or entity that has begun to use it. It means in practice that a contractor that begins preparatory work usually bears responsibility for abandoned waste and payment of the ecological fees.

Frequently, in order to speed up the development project, clients will push contractors to start the work before the ecological investigation of the plot has been completed. The contractor, not having full information on the extent of the plot’s contamination when beginning work, takes on all risks connected with hidden waste “buried” on the plot.

We recommend that contractors, when entering into an agreement on performing land works or works for the preparation/clearing of the territory for construction, including removal of the soil, request detailed information from the customer with regard to the condition of the plot’s soil, thoroughly assess the risks connected with this and set out in works contracts legal mechanisms to protect their interests. In this context, it is very important that works contracts contain a provision delimiting responsibility of the parties for waste, both visible and hidden.

* * *

These problems are of course not the only issues. In Russia, one often encounters plots that contain abandoned military dumping (graves, articles, ammunition), or archeologically valuable items. This of course also creates a number of problems for the owners and possessors of land plots, as well as for their contractors. However, this will be the topic of a separate post.

 

Kluwer Construction Blog

Construction Industry, Construction Law, Contract Administration

Contractual Easter Eggs

by John Bishop

Monday was a public holiday in China, to celebrate Qing Ming, the Chinese tomb-sweeping festival which also happily coincided with Easter. I spent some time explaining to my Chinese friends the Easter story, and how in recent times there have been other interpretations involving bunnies and chocolate eggs.

China has been busy hatching some of its own contractual eggs by taking FIDIC standard forms traditionally used by International Contractors in their overseas projects, and adapted to reflect local conditions and times.

The FIDIC Silver Book has been considered by the the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (”MOHURD”) to promote the EPC contracting model in China. A draft MOHURD standard form was prepared with reference to FIDIC Silver Book and international engineering contracting practices, and released for public comments at the end of 2009. This adaptation by MOHURD appears to have been partly influenced by the GF-1999-0201, a standard form widely used in China, mostly for government financed projects using procurement methods such as competitive bidding.

The resulting risk allocations have turned out quite different from the original “turnkey” nature of the FIDIC Silver Book that may come as a bit of a surprise to those used to EPC contracts. Owners and developers may not get quite the turnkey solution they were expecting in relation to matters such as responsibility for information as to underground conditions and site obstructions, the obligation to obtain approvals, permits and licenses and especially in relation to site safety. It will be of great interest for the construction sector to see how the Chinese EPC form of contract, when finally issued, in fact addresses these matters.

Similarly the Regulation on Construction Market Administration which is likely to be promulgated by the State Council later this year appears influenced by the FIDIC Yellow Book and is likely to provide a clearer legal basis for adopting some of the forms of contracting widely used in the international market, especially in respect of Design and Build contracts.

This Easter also coincides with the anniversary of the Independent Mediation Rules 2008 introduced by the Beijing Arbitration Commission (BAC) on 1 April 2008. These rules were implemented after the participation of over 120 arbitrators and construction engineering experts, including very well known experts. I know this, because my collegue Hew Kian Heong and I were also asked for my own humble contributions to this effort. I therefore know that these Mediation Rules were also drafted so that they could be used to support a multi-tiered dispute resolution process as envisaged by standard form contracts such as ICE and FIDIC.

One of the key attractions of the FIDIC suite of contracts is flexibility, which allow their renewed use in many new markets by taking into account local laws and regulation, and I have no doubt my Chinese friends will capitalize on this advantage its fullest.

 

Kluwer Construction Blog

Construction Industry, Construction Law

Opening the Door to U.S. Federal Court a Wee Bit Wider

by Andrew Ness

When forced to litigate in the U.S., many businesses – especially multinational ones – prefer to be in federal rather than state court. The U.S. Supreme Court just made it a bit easier to fulfill that desire.

Most construction disputes are contract cases not involving federal law, so a federal court will only have jurisdiction if the suit involves more than $75,000 and is between citizens of different U.S. states. The key question is usually: where is a corporation a “citizen” for the purpose of determining whether such “diversity of citizenship” exists?

By statute, a corporation is a citizen of both the state (1) where it is incorporated, and (2) where it maintains its “principal place of business.” While the state of incorporation is obvious, for nearly 60 years, federal courts have struggled to define a corporation’s principal place of business. Last month, the United States Supreme Court reconciled divergent tests and clarified this at last. In Hertz Corp. v. Friend, No. 08-1107, slip op. (Feb. 23, 2010), the Court held that a corporation’s principal place of business is just one place, its headquarters. By limiting corporations to one static principal place of business, Hertz increases the number of states where a corporation is not a citizen, meaning it increases the likelihood of getting access to the federal courts in a particular case.

For 60 years, the Circuit Courts of Appeal have been split over where a corporation had its principal place of business. Some circuits held it was the state containing the corporation’s “nerve center.” Others held it was any state where the corporation conducted significant activities. Thus, in the Ninth Circuit a corporation had a principal place of business wherever the corporation conducted “significantly larger” or “substantially predominant” operations. Under such fluid standards, corporations with a presence in all 50 states might be considered a citizen of most or even all 50 states, effectively precluding access to federal courts. What’s worse, the fluidity of the tests made it impossible to predict the outcome from one case to the next.

In Hertz v. Friend, Hertz was sued by California residents in state court. Hertz removed to federal court, asserting it was not a California citizen. The lower court concluded Hertz’s principal place of business was California under the Ninth Circuit test, Hertz was a California citizen, and thus there was no jurisdiction in federal court. The Ninth Circuit agreed.

The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that a corporation’s principal place of business is best interpreted as “the place where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.” The Court noted in most cases, this should be the state containing the corporate headquarters, “provided that the headquarters is the actual center of direction, control, and coordination.” Id. Hertz’s headquarters is in New Jersey, so it was not a citizen of California and the federal court thus had jurisdiction.

With this relatively simple test for determining principal place of business, Hertz reduces the likelihood that a corporation will be deemed a citizen of more than two states, and makes predictable what those states are. So corporations should have relatively predictable access to federal courts in the remaining 48 states.

 

Kluwer Construction Blog

Construction Industry, Construction Law

Changes Afoot – the Proposed Arbitration Fairness Act

by Andrew Ness

The U.S. has been a staunch supporter of arbitration since 1925, when the U.S. Arbitration Act became law. The Arbitration Act makes arbitration agreements binding and simple to enforce, without significant exception. Rather suddenly, a substantial backlash against mandatory arbitration has appeared on the scene. One of the clearest indicators is the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act (H.R. 1020) that was introduced in the House of Representatives in February of 2009, and is still very much in play. While the anger is not directed at construction dispute arbitration, the concern is that commercial arbitration will end up being limited in important ways, as well as mandatory arbitration schemes where the use of arbitration is seen as one-sided and unfair.

The proposed AFA would limit the scope of the Arbitration Act to exclude from its coverage: a) disputes between an employer and employee arising out of their employment relationship; b) consumer disputes between an individual and the seller or provider of real or personal property, services, money, or credit for personal, family, or household purposes; and c) disputes between a franchisor and a franchisee.
More significantly, the AFA would take away in all arbitrations the arbitrators’ authority to determine the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements. This is a hallmark of U.S. arbitration law that has been generally successful in keeping courts from interfering in the interpretation and enforcement of arbitration agreements. It would be a major departure from current federal policy and several decisions of the United States Supreme Court.

Supporters of the proposed change believe that mandatory arbitration is being used in ways unfair to parties of unequal bargaining power who routinely fail to read the “fine print” mandating arbitration in many consumer transactions, such as when opening a bank account or obtaining a credit card. Among other objections, opponents fear that adding such restrictions would have the unintended consequence of reducing the effectiveness of arbitration as a cost effective remedy for commercial disputes. In reality, the pending legislation is likely to undergo significant revisions in both House and Senate committees before any final votes are taken.

While the construction industry is not specifically targeted by the AFA, concerns have arisen that subcontractors and suppliers, for example, may attempt to claim unequal bargaining power when confronted with standard arbitration clauses contained in many form subcontracts. As a result, those concerned about cost effective and efficient dispute resolution in the construction industry, both within the U.S. and internationally, are following the AFA’s progress through Congress closely.

Kluwer Construction Blog

Construction Industry, Construction Law, Contract Administration

Consultancy agreements and allegations of illegality

by Matthias Scherer

Contractors and suppliers operating abroad often conclude contracts with agents, consultants and other intermediaries who assist them in tender processes as well as in negotiating and performing contracts. Typically, these consultancy agreements provide that disputes are to be submitted to arbitration. Most disputes concern the consultants’ entitlement to a fee. In these disputes, the principal often argues that the contract was illegal under the applicable law. This notably occurred in two cases which led to two recent decisions of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court on applications to set aside or revise arbitral awards.

In the first case, a Swiss and a Taiwanese party had entered into a consultancy agreement in respect of a contract which the Swiss party wished to obtain for managing and maintaining an electricity plant in Taiwan. On the basis of the agreement, the Taiwanese consultant later initiated arbitration under the Swiss Rules of International Arbitration to obtain payment of his fees. The arbitral tribunal found in a partial award that the consultancy agreement was valid.

The Swiss principal applied to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court for revision of the partial award, the time limit for the setting aside of the award, which would have been the ordinary remedy in such a case, having already expired. The principal contended before the Supreme Court that the agreement had an illegal content as it contemplated bribery, and produced new evidence to support its claim. The Court denied the request, as the prerequisites under Swiss law for a review of the award were not met. Indeed, according to the Court, the evidence could have been produced in the arbitration and was therefore not new. The arbitration resumed and the arbitrators eventually rendered a final award in favour of the consultant.

The principal sought to have the final award set aside on the grounds that it breached public policy, relying on the same evidence on which it had previously sought to rely in its request for review of the partial award. The principal further argued that the Supreme Court must examine the alleged nullity of a contract on its own motion. The Court however dismissed the application. It found that the principal could and should have produced the evidence purportedly showing bribery during the arbitration. The Court also ruled that it would not review on its own motion the validity of private law contracts.

The principal again raised its public policy defence in the subsequent enforcement proceedings in Switzerland. The competent cantonal court however ruled that arguments which could have been raised in setting aside proceedings could no longer be raised at the enforcement stage.

In another dispute between a consultant and a principal, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court admitted the principal’s request to set aside an arbitral award due to procedural fraud. In the highly publicized Thales v Frontier AG matter, the award was annulled and the matter remanded to the arbitrators. The facts of the case are summarised below.

In 1989, France authorised the export of new F-3000 frigates to Taiwan. Mainland China objected to the export and a few months later, upon request of a French minister, France withdrew the export authorisation. In 1990, Thomson CSF (which later became Thales), the manufacturer of the frigates, entered into an agreement with Frontier, a Swiss company, to act as its agent. According to the agreement, Frontier was to receive remuneration amounting to 1% of the value of Thomson CSF’s contract with Taiwan for its assistance in relation to the sale of the warships. Behind Frontier was Alfred Sirven, a high ranking manager with the French oil company Elf Aquitaine. Subsequently, in 1991, the French government reversed its previous position and gave its final approval for the sale of the ships. The contract between Thomson and Taiwan was concluded on 31 August 1991 for a purchase price of approximately USD 2.5 billion.

Thomson however refused to pay Frontier, which initiated ICC arbitration as a result. In the arbitration, Thomson contended that the objective of the contract was in fact for Frontier to solicit the services of Edmond Kwan, a consultant of Elf Aquitaine in China, in order that he use his political connections to persuade the Chinese to cease their opposition to the sale of the warships to Taiwan. Thomson argued that the contract was void as its object was influence peddling. Messrs Sirven and Kwan, as well as other witnesses, were heard by the arbitral tribunal.

In 1996, the tribunal rendered its award, ordering Thomson to pay the contractual fee to Frontier. The tribunal found that Frontier had provided the services which were due under the contract by assisting Thomson, through Edmond Kwan, to appease Chinese opposition to the sale. The tribunal admitted that influence peddling was unlawful but found that it had not been proven that influence peddling had occurred. Thomson subsequently initiated criminal proceedings in France against Mr. Kwan and others for giving false testimony before the arbitral tribunal. On 1 October 2008, the French authorities ceased their investigation as a result of Mr. Sirven’s death and because there was insufficient evidence against the other actors. The French authorities however concluded that Sirven had indeed given false testimony during the arbitration.

On 17 December 2008, Thales (formerly Thomson) brought a request for review of the 1996 arbitral award before the Swiss Federal Supreme Court on the basis of the findings of the French authorities. The French investigation had shown that the real objective of the contract between Thomson and Frontier was not to lobby for the sale of the warships in China, but rather to persuade a French minister, who wanted to avoid retaliation measures by Mainland China, to reconsider his objections to the sale. Commissions had therefore been paid by Frontier to Mr. Sirven and a woman who had privileged relations with the minister. Mr. Sirven had represented to the arbitral tribunal that Mr. Kwan had been the only beneficiary of a commission, however it was uncovered that he had implicated Mr. Kwan merely for the purposes of the arbitration. The Swiss Supreme Court ruled that it had been established that Mr. Sirven had orchestrated an influence peddling scheme to the detriment of the French authorities. He had misled the arbitral tribunal and was therefore guilty of procedural fraud. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, Mr. Sirven’s untruthful testimony had had a direct influence on the tribunal’s award. Consequently, the Supreme Court annulled the award and remanded the matter to the original arbitral tribunal or a new tribunal to be constituted in accordance with the ICC Rules.

Conclusions

Several conclusions can be drawn from these two cases. The first is that arbitral tribunals and the Swiss Supreme Court will not uphold contracts that are flawed by illegality. However, it is for the party which alleges an illegality to prove it. Another conclusion to be drawn is that if evidence of illegality exists at the time of the arbitration, it must imperatively be produced in the arbitral proceedings. A party therefore cannot hold back evidence, even if it is self-incriminating, and rely on it in subsequent annulment or enforcement proceedings in the event of an unfavourable outcome of the arbitral proceedings. On the other hand, if a party misleads the arbitral tribunal, as could be uncovered in subsequent criminal proceedings, an arbitral award may not stand.

By Matthias Scherer and Sam Moss

 

 

Kluwer Construction Blog

Construction Industry

Majority of new buildings do not follow building code – JEA

AMMAN – The vast majority of new buildings constructed in the Kingdom, excluding the capital, do not comply with the National Building Code (NBC), according to the Jordan Engineers Association (JEA).
Stressing that failure to follow regulations puts the safety of buildings at risk in the event of major earthquakes, Mahmoud Subhi, head of the JEA’s technical affairs and engineering supervision committee, told The Jordan Times in a recent interview that citizens are obligated to comply with the NBC. …

Construction Industry

The emergence of Asian construction contractors in the Middle East

by Mark Raymont
In recent years, the Middle East has proved to be one of the most attractive construction and engineering markets in the world for international contractors. Notwithstanding the present global economic climate, parts of the Middle East continue to present significant opportunities and many global construction contractors are active in the region. Among the most prominent are construction contractors who are head-quartered in the Asia Pacific area, as is illustrated by some of the more high-profile projects in the Middle East, where construction contractor consortia have include many of the major Japanese and South Korean construction firms. …

Construction Industry

Contractors are left guessing in the Gulf

The Gulf’s construction clients are struggling to make up their minds. Governments may be busy issuing tenders for new projects, but few awards are following once bids come in. For contractors, this presents serious problems, as they do not know if or when they will get any new work.

In Abu Dhabi, for instance, the first tenders have been issued for the MGM development at Mina Zayed, and contractors have been told to submit bids in May for a new 60,000-seat stadium in the Capital City area. But at the same time, the tender for Tawam hospital has been cancelled and contractors and consultants have been waiting for months for awards on a sewage tunnel programme and a metro system. …

Construction Industry, Contract Administration

New decade, new development of the remoteness rule

by Sarah Thomas

In this, the second of my New Year updates, I would like to discuss two interesting cases which have recently been decided by the UK courts. The first is the UK Court of Appeal upholding of a first instance judgment and the comments that the Court made on the recoverability of damages under English contract law.

The case is Supershield Limited v Siemens Building Technologies FE Ltd. As a reminder, the basic test under English law is that a party will recover losses flowing from the breach that (i) arise naturally, in the usual course of things, or (ii) are losses which the parties may reasonably be taken to have contemplated when entering into the contract (the “Hadley v. Baxendale” test, often known as the “remoteness” test). A previous recent development of this area resulted from the House of Lord’s decision in the Achilleas case which suggests that a defendant will not be liable for losses – even those which are not unusual and therefore potentially not too “remote” – which he cannot reasonably be regarded as having assumed responsibility for.

The facts of the Supershield case (whether Siemens could recover from its defaulting subcontractor the losses flowing from a series of failures in a water sprinkler system and in particular, the amount that Siemens had settled for a claim upstream with the main contractor) are not so important as what the Court said about the current interpretation of this remoteness rule. It held that Hadley v. Baxendale remains the standard rule and reflects “the expectation or intention reasonably to be imputed to the parties”. The Court went on to say that this can be interpreted so that “…if on the proper analysis of the Contract against its commercial background, the loss was within the scope of duty (i.e. what was within the contract breaker’s duty to prevent under the Contract) it cannot be regarded as too remote, even if it would not have occurred in ordinary circumstances”.

This means that under English law, a contract breaker can still be liable for damages even if those damages would have been considered unlikely by the parties when entering into the contract. Thus this judgment is important for its distinction between what “intention can be imputed between the parties” as to what damages should be covered and likelihood/foreseeability.

Another case, from a Scottish court, provides an interesting example of notice bars in a construction contract being strictly enforced in the UK. The case in question, Education 4 Ayrshire v South Ayrshire Council involved a contractor who had contracted to design and build six schools for the South Ayrshire Council under a PPP contract. During the works, asbestos that had not been revealed by a previous survey was discovered. This qualified as a “Works Compensation Event” under the contract, for which the Contractor might be entitled to an extension of time, payment of compensation and/or relief from its obligations but provided that the proper procedure was followed.
The Authority rejected the contractor’s claim for an extension of time and compensation on the basis that the contractor had failed to give the required notice in accordance with Clause 17 of the contract.
The judge agreed that the Contractor had not in fact complied with clause 17. He explained that once it is accepted that compliance with the notice clause is a condition precedent (and both parties agreed that it was), the question is simply, “what does the clause require?” In this case the clause required the Contractor to give notice of its claim. What the Contractor’s letter to the Authority about the delay actually said was “We will submit our full claim in accordance with clause 17.6 (…)”. This was held not to be valid notice under clause 17.6. A number of readers, particularly those from non-common law jurisdictions, will be surprised by this, as the Contractor had indeed flagged to the employer that a claim was being sought. But it just goes to show how strictly these notice provisions may be interpreted under English law and the need to follow ‘the letter of the contract’. You may recall that I answered a query on notices from a project manager recently (see Ask the Expert, February 2010) and warned of the need to check that the notice strictly complied with all formalities.
“But how is this equitable?” a number of you will cry. In the case, the judge said that the whole purpose of the clause is to give certainty – the Authority should not have to infer or assume from correspondence that a claim will be made. In this case, in accordance with the contractual notice provisions, the chief executive of the Authority was entitled to formal notification of a claim. The fact that those “on the ground” at the Authority may have been aware of the situation (the Authority was sent a copy of the survey report, attended a meeting to discuss its implications and had been provided with a copy of the Sub-Contractor’s claim against the Contractor in relation to the same event) was irrelevant.

Food for thought….

Please let me know if any of you have come across similar situations.


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